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FRANCHISING IN ARGENTINA:
CHALLENGES FOR THE FOREIGN
FRANCHISOR
Gustavo M. Papeschi*
I. INTRODUCTION: FOCUS AND SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
HIS article discusses many of the challenges that a foreign
franchisor may encounter while trying to export its business to Ar-
gentina under a franchising structure. It focuses on those topics in
which the Argentine legal system presently differs most from U.S. law.
Nonetheless, these references to U.S. law should only be regarded as aca-
demic, given that this article's conclusions and general perspectives about
the current Argentine legal system should be useful to any foreign
investor.
Even though many of the topics affecting a franchising investment are
similarly regulated by both the Argentine and U.S. laws,' significant dif-
ferences exist. Whether they are rooted in the very legal foundation of
the Argentine legal system or they are the product of incidental circum-
stances, those differences may substantially affect a foreign franchisor. In
that sense, this article seeks to cover topics such as the particularities of
the contractual system affecting the franchisor business, labor liabilities
of the franchisor or sub-franchisor, currency issues, value added tax, and
tax withholdings. In addition, it also discusses a proposed new Civil and
Commercial Code (the "New Code") currently being discussed by the
National Congress. 2 This New Code includes several provisions affecting
the franchising business.
*Gustavo M. Papeschi is an Argentine lawyer whose practice focuses in cross bor-
der transactions as well as litigation in banking related issues. He obtained his law
degree from Universidad de Belgrano (with highest honors, 2006), and his LL.M.
in Comparative and International Law from SMU Dedman School of Law (2013).
He is a senior associate with Estudio Beccar Varela in Buenos Aires, and has
worked during 2013 as a foreign associate with Haynes and Boone, LLP.
1. Although this may sound like an overstatement, given the many differences be-
tween the legal systems, note that both legislations share the basic constitutional
principles, values, and aspirations. See generally U.S. CONST.; CONSTITUCION NA-
CIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
2. It is unclear whether the new Civil Code will be passed. Therefore, this article will
only refer to it when addressing the particular issues that will be affected if en-
acted. Marval O'Farrell & Mairal, Argentina: Bill to Reform the Civil and Com-
mercial Codes, MONDAQ (Dec. 12, 2012), http://mondaq.com/x/210766/
Constitutional+Administrative+Law/Bill+To+Reform+The+Civil+And+
Commercial+Codes.
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As a consequence, this article should not be regarded as a comprehen-
sive guide to doing business in Argentina (not even for the franchising
business specifically) because many legal issues are discussed indirectly
and briefly (if discussed at all).
II. LEGAL BASIS OF FRANCHISING IN ARGENTINA:
CONTRACTS
A. AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM IN ITS SPANISH TRANSLATION
Although the term franquicia is the proper Spanish translation for
"franchise," the term may have several other meanings in everyday
speech. 3 As a consequence, most businessmen, lawyers, and scholars use
the English term franchising to refer to this contract. However, as no
express legal regulation currently exists for the franchising business, there
is no major legal consequence in using one term or the other.4
The New Code, on the other hand, defines franchising as the contract
by means of which a party (franchisor) grants another party (franchisee)
the right to use a proven system, addressed to commercialize certain
goods or services under the franchisor's commercial name, logo or mark,
which will provide the technical knowledge, as well as the continuous
technical or commercial assistance for a direct or indirect consideration
paid by the franchisee.5
B. CONTRACTUAL LEGISLATION: ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE AND
COMMERCIAL CODE
Contractual law in Argentina is governed by both the Civil Code and
the Commercial Code (hereinafter referred as "Civil Code" and "Com-
mercial Code"). 6 Although these bodies of law have been amended sev-
eral times throughout their existence, the original underlying texts date
back to the late 19th century. 7 The Civil Code provides general rules
3. (i) The most common alternate meaning offranquicia relates to an insurance pol-
icy: is the equivalent of the U.S. insurance's deductible, meaning that the insurer
would only be liable for any damage in excess of that certain amount; (ii) another
common meaning for the term is related to customs duties: franquicia is the maxi-
mum amount of value that a person may import to the country without paying any
custom duties; (iii) in consonance with the translations referred to above, the term
is also generally used to describe any type of exemption; (iv) finally, it refers to a
franchising business: however, it is rarely used in that sense, to the extent that, if
someone is talking about a franquicia, he or she should immediately add a refer-
ence to known franchising businesses to clarify the meaning of the term. Fran-
quicia, DicciONARIO DE LA REAL ACADEMIA EsPARqOLA, http://lema.rae.es/drae/
?val=Franquicia (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
4. See generally COD. Civ.; COD. COM.
5. CODIGO CIVIL Y COMERCIO [COD. CIv. Y COM.] [UNIFIED CIVIL AND COMMEIR-
CIAL CoDI DRAFI art. 1512 (2012) (Arg.).
6. See generally CODIGO DE COMERCIO [COD. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] (Arg.);
CODIC;O CIVIL [COD. Civ.] [CiviL CODE] (Arg.). The New Civil Code unifies the
Civil and Commercial Code into one body of law.
7. Law No. 340, Sep. 25, 1869, [1863/69] R.N. 513 (Arg.); Law No. 2637, Oct. 5, 1889,
[II] R.N. 795 (Arg.).
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applying to all contracts, while the Commercial Code provides specific
rules for those contracts entered by merchants.8 Practicing lawyers usu-
ally consider the Civil Code the main body of law and only refer to the
Commercial Code in very specific occasions (i.e., rules of interpretation
of contracts). 9
These two bodies of law (as amended from time to time) set forth the
basic provisions regarding the general theory of contracts (capacity
rules, 10 formalities," evidence,' 2 voidance and validity,t 3 etcetera) and
also provide special regulations for specific contracts (such as sale of
goods,'14 assignment of rights,15 agency,' 6 etcetera).
In addition to both the Commercial and Civil Codes, many other fed-
eral laws also impact contractual relationships, either by providing certain
general rules for particular types of contracts (i.e., the Consumer Defense
Act, 17 which sets forth several rules for contracts executed between
merchants and consumers), or by providing special regulation for specific
contracts (i.e., the Urban Rent Agreements Act,' 8 which provides special
rules for the lease of real property located within urban areas).
C. LACK OF LEGAL REGULATION: FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Neither the Civil Code, nor the Commercial Code, nor any special law
provide special rules for the franchising contract.19 Consequently, Ar-
gentine law does not expressly define the term franchising or any other
term that reflects the nature of this contract.
Nonetheless, the absence of special regulation is not an obstacle for the
execution and enforceability of these types of contracts.20 Contractual
parties have complete freedom to agree upon any desired terms, and
there are very few mandatory provisions regarding the content of the
agreement.2' In fact, other than the general prohibition of illegal content,
most mandatory restrictions refer to contracts involving minors and fam-
ily issues, and thus are unlikely to affect any business contract.
22
Even if there are no obstacles preventing the legality and enforceability
of a franchising agreement in Argentina, some issues should be taken into
account, as they might affect the contractual outcome.
8. See generally COo. CoM.; COD. Civ.
9. COD. COM. arts. 217-18.
10. COD. Civ. arts. 1160-66.
11. Id. arts. 1180-89.
12. Id. arts. 1190-94.
13. Id. arts. 1037-65.
14. Id. arts. 1323-1433.
15. Id. arts. 1434-84.
16. Id. arts. 1869-1985.
17. Law No. 24240, Oct. 15, 1993, 27744 B.O. 34 (Arg.).
18. Law No. 23091, Oct. 16, 1984, 25531 B.O. I (Arg.).
19. See generally COD. Civ.; COD. COM.
20. COD. Civ. arts. 1143, 1197.
21. See generally COD. CIv.; COD. COM.
22. COD. Civ. arts. 953, 1275.
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The franchising agreement is considered an "untypical" 23 contract be-
cause no special regulation exists for it. As a consequence, in the event of
a conflict and in the absence of specific contractual provisions, there are
no clear default rules for this contract (other than general rules applicable
to all contracts).24
Two issues may arise:
(i) It is difficult for lawyers to precisely predict which set of regula-
tions would eventually apply in a future ruling. A court may de-
cide that default rules provided for other contracts apply (i.e.,
default rules set forth for the sales of goods contract or the assign-
ment of rights contract). 25 However, because the franchise agree-
ment is not one of those contracts, those "artificially" applied rules
might not reflect the real intention of the parties.
(ii) As explained further below, Argentine law provides that the exer-
cise of a right or the fulfillment of a duty may not be done in an
abusive manner (called "abuse of right").26 In short, this principle
has been used by the courts to solve legal conflicts using concepts
of fairness or equity, instead of hard legal principles. Lack of con-
tractual provisions may trigger this principle most easily and,
therefore, cause unexpected results.
These risks should be taken into special account when drafting the
franchising agreement or any incidental agreement. In order to avoid or
minimize these risks, the agreements should be drafted thoroughly and,
to the extent possible, provide a contractual solution for all foreseeable
conflicts.
D. THE FRANCHISING AGREEMENT IN THE NEW CODE
Contrary to the current legal scenario, the New Code specifically rec-
ognizes the franchising agreement and regulates it in thirteen articles27
(in addition to containing several cross-references to other provisions of
this new body of law).
The new regulation includes many provisions reflecting trends from
foreign legislation. In addition to including a few default rules, it also sets
23. Maure, Martin Jos6, Reflexiones sobre la Responsabilidad del Franquiciante frente
a Terceros Dependientes del Franquiciado, DT2011 Aug. 1969. Under Argentine
Contractual law there are two types of contracts: typical and untypical contracts.
Typical contracts are those that have a special default regulation under the Civil or
Commercial Codes, or under any special law. On the other hand, untypical con-
tracts are those that are not specially regulated. COD. Civ. art 1143. Although
both types of contracts are fully enforceable, typical contracts are complemented
by legal default rules if any conflict arises between the parties. That is not the case
for untypical contracts, where no specific regulation exists for untypical contracts.
Although case law and scholar opinions may provide some defaults rules, they are
not considered mandatory authority.
24. Id.
25. COD. Civ. arts. 1323-1433; 1434-84.
26. Id. art. 1071.
27. COD. Civ. Y CoM. arts. 1512-24 (2012 Draft).
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forth some mandatory provisions, such as prohibiting the franchisor from
owning any corporate interest in the franchisee entity,28 requiring a mini-
mal contract term (except for special circumstances), 29 requiring a prior
disclosure procedure with regards to the evolution of other franchise
units in the country or abroad,30 and term and termination provisions,
31
among others. It also expressly declares that a franchising relationship
shall not be considered, by itself, as an antitrust action.32 Finally, it
clearly provides that, from a labor standpoint, the parties are indepen-
dent and the franchisor is not liable for the franchisee's labor related
commitments. 3
3
E. ABUSO DEL DERECHO DOCTRINE
1. Introduction
The abuso del derecho doctrine (which can roughly be translated as
abuse of right) is a very important general principle in civil law systems
and it is commonly applied in Argentine courts. Any foreign attorney
advising on investments in Argentina (or in any other civil law country)
should be familiar with its essential elements.
It may be best described as a general principle intended to prevent the
exercise of a legally granted right in a manner that does not reflect a
certain degree of fairness in accordance with the ratio legis of a particular
legal provision. 34 In other words, it may be considered a kind of equity
principle to help reduce the harshness of written law or legal formalities.
Although there are some comparable legal provisions under U.S. law
(i.e. the avoidability doctrine3 5 and the unconscionable contract), 36 this
doctrine goes far beyond those. To the contrary, this doctrine is one of
the very foundations of the legal system and serves as a guide to all legal
relationships.37
Although most Argentine lawyers would praise this principle and con-
sider it part of the very foundation of the Argentine law, they would
equally consider it a double-edged sword. Given that there are no defini-
tive guidelines for its application, it is difficult to precisely foresee how it
may be applied by a judge and to what extent it could affect any contrac-
28. Id. art. 1512.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 1514(a).
31. Id. arts. 1512, 1516, 1522.
32. See id.
33. Id. art. 1520(b).
34. See COD. Civ. art. 1071.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981).
36. U.C.C. § 2-302; RESTATEMENlr (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 208 (1981). It is worth
mentioning that the Argentine Civil Code also contains a specific section that reg-
ulates unconscionable terms (COD. Civ. art. 954). However, it is mostly consid-
ered as a consequence of the abuso del derecho doctrine.
37. AdriAn Oscar Morea, La Doctrina del Abuso Procesal en la Derecho Argentino,
Nov. 22, 2012, INFOJus, http://www.infojus.gov.ar/doctrina/dacfl20l95-morea-
doctrinaabuso-procesalen.htm?4 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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tual right or obligation. 38
2. Legislative Basis
The general principle and basis of this doctrine are set forth in the Civil
Code, which provides that:
[t]he regular exercise of one's right or the fulfillment of one's legal
duty shall not turn illegal any act. The Law does not safeguard the
abusive exercise of rights. It shall be considered such [the exercise]
that contradicts the ends of the drafter when it recognized [the right],
or those that exceed the limits imposed by good faith, moral and
goods practices. 39
In addition, the Civil Code also contains a related principle that pro-
vides that contracts "should be executed, construed and enforced under a
good faith standard," 40 which further supports this doctrine.
Needless to say, the limits of this doctrine are far from clear and fore-
seeable. The judge is not always aware of the intent of the drafter; on the
other hand, no one is able to clearly say what good faith, moral, or good
practices really are.
3. Practical Consequences and Guidelines
Whether this doctrine should apply or not to a particular case is a ques-
tion of fact.41 Usually, a judge may invoke it when he feels that the out-
come of applying the strict legal or contractual provision might be unfair.
Although judges are usually cautious when applying this doctrine, it is
important to recognize that what is written in an agreement may not nec-
essarily be enforceable because of the factual circumstances surrounding
the contract. Even if this is also true for contracts governed by U.S. law
(e.g. unconscionable terms), under Argentine law the possibility increases
substantially.
It is not easy to provide clear guidelines to prevent the application of
this doctrine. However, some circumstances may help to minimize the
chances that it will be applied or the effects of its application.
(i) Bargaining power. As in the case of procedural unconscionability
under U.S. law,42 the chances for facing the effects of this doctrine
are minimized when it is proven that the parties have specifically
38. As the original drafter of the Civil Code stated when he refused to legislate this
doctrine, "[i]f the government acts as a judge of the abuse ... it will not be long
until it acts as a judge of the use, and any true idea of property and freedom would
be lost". COo. Civ. art. 2513 (author note).
39. COD. Civ. art. 1071.
40. COD. Civ. art. 1198.
41. Daniel Roque Vitolo, Un reiterado y saludable freno de la Corte a los acuerdos
preventivos abusivos y en fraude a la ley, LA LEY 2009-F, 328.
42. Wilcox v. Valero Ref. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (relying on
unequal bargaining power as a factor in ruling that the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement implemented after an employee's lawsuit was filed was procedur-
ally unconscionable); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §4.28 (3rd ed. 2004)("Procedural unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not only the
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negotiated the terms of the contracts and both parties have a simi-
lar bargaining position.43
Consequently, terms agreed upon by corporate parties are better pro-
tected than terms agreed upon by a corporate party and an individual.
However, the corporate character of the parties is far from definitive, as
the individual power to bargain is the real factor. Accordingly, some
judges may find that foreign corporations, especially financial institutions,
are in a better bargaining position than local counterparts.
44
Furthermore, judges are bound to rule as abusive some terms in con-
sumer contracts or employment contracts where the application of the
doctrine has a legal basis.4
5
(ii) Thoroughness of contractual terms. As stated above, even if both
parties have similar bargaining power, the doctrine may still find
its way as a subsidiary or default rule. Therefore, legal counsel
should draft the agreement with as much detail as possible.
(iii) Legislative and case law support. Even if the doctrine's purpose is
to avoid the harshness of legal or contractual provisions, the exis-
tence of a law or regulation that supports a specific term (even if
completely unrelated to a franchise agreement) would provide
some protection. For example, the Central Bank of Argentina has
established that the interest rate for outstanding credit card debt
should not exceed 50 percent of the original interest rate for said
debt.46 Therefore, if the default interest rate of any royalty pay-
ment is below that limit, it will surely be upheld by a court.
To the contrary, exceeding that limit will mean that a court would
surely find that term abusive (even if no specific relation exists between
the term and the formal regulation).
F. TERMINATION OF THE FRANCHISING AGREEMENT
1. Introduction
Other than the general rules that uphold any private arrangement
among the parties, no specific regulations exist for agency, distribution, or
franchising agreements. Nonetheless, courts have been rather active in
this area, particularly referring to agency and distribution agreements,
and mostly basing their rulings on the abuso del derecho doctrine.4 7 Al-
employment of sharp bargaining practices and the use of fine print and convoluted
language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power").
43. See Wilcox, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
44. Of course, this tendency may only be described as a feeling among corporate law-
yers in Argentina and, obviously, is not reflected in any case or scholar's opinion.
45. Law No. 24240 art. 36, Oct. 15, 1993, B.O. 27744, 34 (as amended) (Arg.); Law No.
20744 art. 7, Sept. 29, 1974, B.O. 23003, 2 (as amended) (Arg.).
46. Central Bank of Argentina, Comunicaci6n "A" No. 3052: Tasas de Interns en las
Operaciones de Cr6dito, Circular OPRAC 1-475, § 2.2.1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
47. Cimara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de Lomas de Zamora, sala I
[CApel.CCLZ] [Lomas de Zamora Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals, Sec-
tion I], 06/05/2007, "Mansilla, Oscar c. Shell C.A.P.S.A.," La Ley Buenos Aires
[L.L.B.A.] (2007-Oct.-1045) (Arg.).
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though this doctrine is present in any termination case, it becomes partic-
ularly important with regard to termination without good cause.
2. Termination for Good Cause
Contractual parties are free to agree upon any termination clause.
Even if there is no special provision on termination, the parties may nev-
ertheless terminate the contract if good cause exists. 48 In most cases, the
good cause will most likely be a party's material breach of the contract, 49
though there are other valid reasons provided by law (impossibility, im-
practicability, et cetera). 50 In addition, the parties may expressly include
several events of default (bankruptcy, material change of circumstances,
failure to achieve certain economic goals, etcetera). 51 Although these
provisions are generally accepted by courts, some issues should be
pointed out:
(i) If no special contractual provision has been included (or even if
there was), a minor breach would not permit the other party to
terminate the contract: that breach should amount to a material
breach. 52 Although no particular legal provisions exist to qualify a
breach as a material breach, the most important factor is the es-
sential benefit sought by the injured party (as provided in the
agreement). 53
(ii) As any other term in the contract, the abuso del derecho doctrine
may also apply for termination clauses.
(iii) The injured party (terminating party) has the burden of proving
materiality of the breach. 54
3. Termination Without Good Cause,
Even if the parties can agree to their own termination clauses with al-
most unlimited freedom (as well as any event of default), the issue arises
when a party seeks to exercise a termination clause that allows him to
terminate the contract without good cause (usually, only requiring a prior
notice).
Under both the Civil and Commercial Codes, this type of termination
(when expressly provided by the contract) should not create any liability
48. CODi. COM. art. 216.
49. Id.; COD. Civ. art. 1204 (both provisions are essentially the same); Cdmara Na-
cional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala E [CNCom.][National Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, Section El, 31/03/
2008, "Pdrez, Faustino Jorge c. Correo Arg, S.A.," La Ley [L.L.O.] (2008-AR/
JUR-2682).
50. COD. Civ. arts. 888, 1198.
51. COD. Civ. art. 1195, 1204.
52. C~mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala A [CNCom] [National
Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, Section A], 31/03/1995,





for the franchisor. 55 Although such a provision is most common in indefi-
nite-term contracts, where it may be even construed as existing without
specific provision, it may also be included in fixed-term contracts.
Nonetheless, case law developed a doctrine called economic depen-
dency. This doctrine arises in those cases where the ongoing concern of a
firm primarily depends on a contract with the other party (usually the
stronger party). Pursuant to this doctrine (which is a consequence of the
abuso del derecho doctrine), the right to terminate a contract can only be
exercised in a regular and non-abusive manner and within the limits of
good faith,56 which has to be evidenced on a case-by-case basis.57 It par-
ticularly applies to indefinite-term and long-term contracts that required
an important investment on behalf of the injured party in order to allow
them to amortize such investment.
58
Dependency on the other party and necessity of a large investment are
clearly features to be found in the majority (if not all) franchising
agreements.
Several factors might make this doctrine applicable:
(i) The total length of consecutive contracts (including any renewal
between the parties);
(ii) Whether the franchisee has an exclusivity obligation for the
franchise;
(iii) Whether the contract may be construed as unconscionable (both
from a procedural and a material point of view);
(iv) The parties' actual bargaining power in the contract.
If, in the case of an early termination without proper cause, the doc-
trine is deemed applicable, prior notice must be submitted reasonably in
advance to the other party.5 9 An average of one month per year of con-
tractual relationship has been considered sufficient.
60
If no proper prior notice was given, the injured party may claim:
(i) Any investment made upon reliance on the contract that had not
been amortized by the performance of the contract,
(ii) Labor severance payments,
55. COr. CoM. art. 216; COo. Civ. art. 1204. Note that if no provision is included,
parties to a fixed-term agreement are not able to terminate the agreement without
good cause or after the contractual term has expired.
56. COn. Civ. art. 1071; CCLZ, 06/05/2007, "Mansilla, Oscar," LLBA (2007-Oct.-
1045).
57. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJNI [National Supreme Court of Jus-
tice], 08/04/1988, "Automotores Saavedra, S.A. c. Fiat Arg. S.A.," Fallos (1988-311-
1352).
58. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala E [National Court of Com-
mercial Appeals, section El, 17/08/2006, "Etchelecu, Francisco J. c. Carl Zeiss Ar-
gentina S.A. y otros" (Arg.).
59. Id.
60. Note that although case law is generally not mandatory in Argentina, judges usu-
ally take this rule of thumb into consideration to ground their decisions. CSJN, 08/
04/1988, "Automotores Saavedra," Fallos (1988-311-1337).
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(iii) Penalties for early termination of any contract executed by the
franchisee to perform the franchising contract (e.g. leases). 61
It is worth noting that the injured party has the burden of proving these
damages.62 Even if no proper prior notice was given, liability will only
extend to the proven damages. 63
4. Fixed-Term Agreements Renewal
Generally, when the agreement comes to the expiration of its term, it is
terminated and no further liability exists for either party because neither
party relied on the contract renewal. Therefore, they should have fore-
seen that any investment they may have made might be useless after ter-
mination (at least, with relation to the contract at hand) and, therefore,
assumed the business risk that the contract may not be renewed. 64
Nonetheless, two circumstances should be noted:
(i) The party in the weaker position may claim that, even if the con-
tract had a fixed term, consecutive fixed-term agreements or con-
tinuing an expired contract without a formal renewal have created
an indefinite-term agreement. In that case, the franchisor may not
be able to prevail under the argument that it was a fixed-term
agreement. Such construction would be easier to reach if an auto-
matic renewal provision was included in the contract.
(ii) The party in the weaker position may also claim that, even if no
renewal was executed, the franchisor had expressly or impliedly
(through its conduct) assured the franchisee that a renewal would
be entered into and that, relying on that fact, it made several in-
vestments that turned out to be useless.
Because of these circumstances, it is advisable to give the franchisee
notice of the termination, even if the contract is fixed-term and the termi-
nating party is not required to do so.
5. Termination Under the New Code
Contrary to the current legislation, the New Code has thoroughly regu-
lated contractual term and termination issues.
First, there is a minimum term of two years for fixed-term franchising
agreements. 65 Only under special circumstances may the parties agree
61. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala B [CNCom] [National
Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, section B], 26/12/2005, "Lo-
caliza Franchising Int'l S.R.L. c. Prez, Marcelo F.", La Ley [L.L.] (2006-D-25).
62. Id.
63. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, sala D [CNCom] [National
Court of Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, section D], 13/07/2000, "Dis-
tric6ndor S. A. c. Editorial Coyuntura S. A.," La Ley [L.L.] (2000-F-524).
64. CAmara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala II [CNTrab] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section II], 26/05/1988, "Garrido, Jos6 M. c. intersec, S. A.," La
Ley [L.L.] (1988-E-387).
65. COD. Civ. Y' COM. arts. 1514, 1516 (2012 Draft).
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upon a shorter term.66 Indefinite-term agreements can only be termi-
nated after three years.67
Any fixed-term agreement (except for those with a term shorter than
three years, provided that there were special circumstances justifying the
shorter term) is considered automatically renewed for one (1) year at the
expiration of its original term, unless either party has terminated it with
thirty days prior notice. 68 As of that renewal, it will be deemed converted
into an indefinite-term agreement. 69
Finally, if at any moment (for indefinite-term agreements) or upon the
term expiration (for fixed-term ones), any party wishes to terminate the
agreement without cause, they are required to provide prior notice.
70
The prior notice period shall be equal to one month per year of contrac-
tual relationship, with a maximum period of six months.71 Failure to pro-
vide notice will grant the terminated party the right to claim any lost
profits to be obtained during that period. 72
Finally, the contract cannot be terminated without good cause (by just
one party) during the originally agreed upon term (even if termination
without good cause was agreed upon in the agreement). 73
III. TAXES
A. LACK OF REGULATION
Similarly to the situation under contract law, there are no special tax
rules for franchising agreements. 74 Therefore, in order to calculate taxes
over any franchising agreement and related agreements, general tax prin-
ciples apply. Needless to say, that lack of regulation may produce some
uncertainty for both the franchisor and franchisee.
B. BRIEF SUMMARY OF TAXES IN ARGENTINA
As a federal country, taxes in Argentina are levied at three different
levels: (i) national or federal, (ii) provincial, and (iii) municipal. 7 5




69. Id. art. 1516.
70. COD. Civ. Y COM. art. 1522(d) (2012 Draft).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1522(b).
74. This statement is based on federal level tax law. There may be some legislation at
a provincial and municipal level containing special tax regulation for the franchis-
ing agreements; nonetheless, its impact on foreign investments should be
negligible.
75. Tax Structure in Argentina, GLOBAL ALLIANCE oi- SMEs, http://www.globalsmes
.org/news/index.php?funcdetail&detailid=562&catalog=29&lan=en&search-key
words= (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
76. Law No. 20628, Dec. 31, 1973, 22821 B.O. 6 (as amended) (Arg.).
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(b) value added tax (VAT),77 and (c) tax on credits and debits in
bank accounts (CDT). 78
- The Income Tax is based on the worldwide income obtained by
individuals, legal entities domiciled in Argentina (with permanent
establishment in Argentina), and Argentine branches of foreign
entities.79
- The VAT is levied on the sale of goods, provision of services, and
importation of goods. 80 Basically, it is levied upon the value ad-
ded at each stage of the production and distribution chain (in-
cluding purchase for final consumption). Under certain
circumstances, services rendered outside Argentina that are effec-
tively used or exploited in Argentina are deemed rendered in Ar-
gentina and are therefore subject to VAT (i.e., technical
assistance). 81 The tax is levied on the difference between the tax-
debit (the tax payable on the value added in that stage) and the
tax-credit (the tax that was paid when acquiring the asset from
the provider and before adding value to it).82 The general rate
for this tax is 21 percent.83
- The CDT is generally levied on every credit or debit made in any
checking account.84 The rate is 0.6 percent over the amount of
the debit or credit and is deductible from the Income Tax. 85
(ii) At the provincial level, there are two taxes worth mentioning as
they are specially regulated by the provincial legislatures: (a) the
Turnover Tax (tax on gross income), which is levied on the amount
of gross income resulting from business activities conducted within
the provincial territory, and (ii) the Stamp Tax, which is levied on
written documents with economic content either executed in or
having effects in the provincial territory.86
(iii) At the municipal level, there are several taxes, mostly related to
advertising, security, and hygiene, and other duties related to
property (i.e., land) located in the territory.87
Needless to say, this is only a summary of the main taxes that exist in
Argentina, as many others exist as well. This article focuses only on the
Income Tax, because of its particular importance to franchising
agreements.
77. Law No. 20631, Dec. 31, 1973, 22821 B.O. 14 (as amended) (Arg.).
78. Law No. 25413, Mar. 26, 2001, 29616 B.O. I (as amended) (Arg.).
79. Law No. 20628 of Dec. 31, 1973.




84. Law No. 25413 of Mar. 26, 2001.
85. Id.
86. BAKER & MCKENZIE, THE CONCISE TAX GUIDE: OVERVIEW ON TAXES IN LATIN
AMERICA 1 (2012) available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/Spain/TheConciseTaxGuideLatinAmerica.pdf.




As stated above, only individuals, corporations, and branches of for-
eign entities are subject to income tax, on the condition that they have a
permanent establishment in Argentina.88 As expected, regulations do
not provide a clear definition of what exactly constitutes a permanent
establishment.
Non-resident individuals and legal entities without a permanent estab-
lishment are only taxed on income from Argentine sources, such as (i)
assets located, placed, or used in Argentina, and (ii) activities in Argen-
tina that produce an economic benefit. 89
On the other hand, any taxes that a resident has paid abroad may be
used (with some restrictions) as credit for Argentine taxes, but only to the
extent that the foreign tax does not exceed the Argentine tax.90
2. Rates: Withholding Tax
The general rate for corporate entities (such as Sociedades Anonimas
and Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada),91 subsidiaries of a foreign
entity with a domicile or permanent establishment in Argentina, and Ar-
gentine branches of foreign entities is 35 percent. 92 Recently, the distri-
bution of dividends or other corporate profits has become levied on
income tax at a reduced rate. 93
On the other hand, any payment made by a resident to a foreign indi-
vidual or entity for services deemed to be from an Argentine source is
subject to a withholding tax under different rates.94 For the purposes of a
franchising investment (and, of course, subject to the particular circum-
stances), the following rates should be taken into account (bear in mind,
however, that no specific regulation for franchising agreements exists):
- Services that cannot be construed as a transfer of technology have a
31.5 percent withholding tax over the amount to be paid. 95
- Any trademark, know-how, or other performance that may be con-
strued as a transfer of technology, carries a 28 percent withholding
tax over the amount to be paid.
96
88. Law No. 20628 of Dec. 31, 1973.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. An equivalent for the Argentine Sociedad An6nima may be found in the U.S.
corporation. An equivalent for the Argentine Sociedad de Responsabilidad Lim-
itada may be found in the U.S. LLC, but unlike the LLC, the Sociedad de Respon-
sabilidad Limitada's regulation comprises more mandatory provisions than the
common regulation for the LLC. BAKER & MCKENZIE, LATIN AMERICAN TAX
TRANSACIrIONS GUIDE 10 (2012), available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/
Uploads/Documents/Spain/LatinAmericanTaxTransactionsGuide%20201 2 .pdf
92. BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 86, at 1.
93. Law No. 26893, Sep. 23, 2010, 32728 B.O. 2.
94. BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 86, at 2.
95. Id. at 3.
96. See infra, subsection 3; BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 86, at 2.
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- Any transfer of technology that is not acquirable in Argentina carries
a 21 percent withholding tax over the amount paid.97
- Any goods provided by a foreign individual or entity do not have
withholding tax (however, they do have VAT and other customs du-
ties which rates vary according to the particular circumstances).
Argentina is a party to several tax treaties that impose maximum rates
on the withholding of certain taxable income. But no double taxation
treaty with the United States is in force.
On the other hand, any contractual grossing-up provision included in
the agreement is ineffective against the tax authority (although binding
among the parties).
3. Transfers of Technology Act
It is worth highlighting that trademark licensing and technology trans-
fer agreements executed by either an Argentine resident as licensee or a
non-resident as licensor are subject to the provisions of the Transfers of
Technology Act.98
Under the regulatory decree of this Act, technology is defined as any
patent, industrial model or design, and/or any other technical knowledge
necessary for the manufacturing of products or the rendering of
services. 99
Even though prior administrative approval of these kinds of agree-
ments is no longer required, all agreements should be registered for sta-
tistical purposes with the Instituto Nacional de Propiedad Industrial
(National Institute of Industrial Property) to obtain preferential rates (if
it is determined that the service may be construed as technology and if it
is acquirable in Argentina). Note that failure to register the agreement
has no effect on its enforceability or validity. 100
4. Transfer Pricing Provisions
An unrelated set of provisions involves what is called transfer pricing
practices, which are considered to exist when (a) an Argentine company
enters into an agreement with either (i) a related foreign company, or (ii)
an unrelated foreign company located in a low-tax jurisdiction, and (b)
the prices agreed upon in those agreements do not reflect normal market
practices (called arm's length).10 1
Any agreement executed with a foreign related company or non-re-
lated company located in a tax haven is presumed not to be at arm's
97. BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 86, at 2.
98. Law No. 22426, Mar. 23, 1981, 24633 B.O. 2 (as amended) (Arg.).
99. Id.




101. Law No. 25063, Dec. 30, 1998, B.O. 29053 (as amended) (Arg.).
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length, unless proper evidence to the contrary is presented. 10 2 This pres-
entation is made by submitting detailed information of the agreement




Argentine labor regulations are one of the major issues any foreign
investor will face. It is governed by countless special laws (such as the
Labor Contract Act (LCA), a central piece of legislation)1 0 4 and regula-
tions emerging from all three levels of the political division (federal, pro-
vincial, and municipal). Although the relationship created between the
employer and the employee is technically a contract, no significant regu-
lation on the matter is provided by the Civil or Commercial Codes. Any
foreign investor should acknowledge the importance of the issue and pro-
cure special professional advice on the matter.
Given that labor regulations are an enormous topic, this article will
only provide a general overview of the matter, pointing out some of the
legal principles and rules that govern the employment relationship, and
briefly touching upon how a franchising investment would be affected by
these particular rules.
B. UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER
The very foundation of Argentine labor law is premised on a simple
idea: the lack of equal bargaining power between the employer and the
individual employees. 10 5 Taking this inequity into consideration, labor
law is a legal instrument that tries to compensate for such inequality.
In that sense, there are several general principles that shape the Argen-
tine labor regulation:
a) The protective principle is the very foundation of labor law. It
strongly limits the effects of any agreement
10 6 or resignation 10 7
made by the employee when such accord is contrary to his or her
legally recognized interests by the thorough labor regulations. 0 8
Therefore, such agreement would not be enforceable against him
(even if expressly agreed upon by him).
b) The reality principle sets forth that whenever there is a relationship
where one person acts as a working force for another in exchange
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Law No. 20744, Sept. 29, 1974, 23003 B.O. 2 (as amended) (Arg.).
105. Id.; Arturo Bronstein, National Labour Law Profile: Republic of Argentina, INTER-
NATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-re
sourceslnational-labour-law-profilesWCMS_158890/lang---en/index.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2014).
106. Law No. 20744 of Sept. 29, 1974 art. 7.
107. Id. art. 12.
108. See generally id.
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for a salary under the employer dependency, there will be an em-
ployment relationship (subject to labor law), regardless of the legal
form, title or name the parties give to said relationship,' 0 9 even if
the "employee" has given his or her full consent to said form." 0
Therefore, signing a non-labor contract, acting as an intern, or any
other of the countless ways in which employers have attempted to
disguise an employment relationship in order to bypass labor regu-
lations is of absolutely no value whatsoever. To the contrary, the
relationship would still be regarded an employment relationship in
every sense, and the employer may be subject to important fines."'
c) The in dubio pro operario principle provides that if doubt arises re-
garding the interpretation of an employee's legal rights, the matter
should be interpreted in his favor.1 2
C. EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND TERMINATION
There are two types of employment contracts: (i) fixed-term contracts,
and (ii) indefinite-term contracts. It is presumed that all employment
contracts are for an indefinite term, unless the employer can prove that
the parties have agreed in writing to a fixed-term contract"1 3 (which can-
not exceed five years)" 4 and that a special reason for it exists." 5 Failure
to prove such circumstance or evidence of any kind of fraud in doing so
(by direct application of the reality principle) would make the contract to
be regarded as an indefinite-term contract. 1 6
The indefinite-term contract may be terminated by either the employee
or the employer at any time. 17 If terminated by the employer, his or her
liability will depend on whether or not there was good cause for said ter-
mination (i.e., a gross violation of the employee's duties). 118 If the em-
ployer cannot prove the existence of a good cause for the termination, he
is required to give the employee prior notice (the length of which would
depend on the duration of the employment), as well as to pay the em-
ployee a severance package based on the employee's highest average
monthly salary (one monthly salary per every year of employment).' 19
Very few cases exist where an employee cannot be terminated by the sole
decision of the employer (i.e., union representatives, public employees,
discrimination cases, etc.). However, it is uncommon for courts to recog-
nize those exceptional situations.
109. Id. arts. 14, 22.
110. See generally id.
1ll. Law No. 24.013 of Dec. 17, 1991, 27286 B.O. 10 (as amended) (Arg.)
112. Id. art. 9.
113. Id. art. 92.
114. Id. art. 93.
115. Id. art. 90.
116. Id. arts. 90, 245.
117. Id.
118. Courts have restricted the existence of good cause to a very narrow extent. There-
fore, it is very difficult for an employer to prove said existence.
119. Id. art. 245.
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D. LABOR LAW AND FRANCHISING
There are no special labor law regulations for the franchising agree-
ment. Therefore, standard labor law applies to the matter.
The most important issue that affects the franchisor is whether or not it
should be liable for labor claims made by the franchisee's employees.
The LCA provides a legal solution for liabilities emerging from a subcon-
tractor's employees. 120 Given that no regulation exists for franchisors
and franchisees, courts have often relied upon this provision to find a
legal solution.
Under this provision, a contractor is liable for its subcontractors' em-
ployees' claims if they perform labor that may be deemed to be related to
the commercial activity of the contractor. 121 Nonetheless, because this
provision was not created for the franchising agreement, when applying
the rule to this type of contract there have been two lines of judicial
interpretation:
(i) A broad interpretation contemplates that because the commerciali-
zation by a franchisee (through its employees) ultimately benefits
the franchisor and its activity, the latter should be held liable for
any claim arising from the franchisee's employees. 122 According to
this interpretation, there would be no logic in the franchisor's ac-
tivity if the franchisee would not commercialize its products.
123
Furthermore, the existence of franchisor's control over the activi-
ties of the franchisee also provides a basis for this interpretation.
124
(ii) A narrow interpretation has considered that the provisions of the
LCA regarding sub-contractors should not be applicable for
franchising relations because the franchisor and franchisee are two
independent contractors.1 25 Nonetheless, courts have ruled that
whenever there is fraud (i.e., the independence of the parties is
120. Id. art. 30.
121. Id.
122. Cgmara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala V [CTrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section V], 18/10/2007, "Santa Clara, Mario c. L.L. y L. S.A. y
Otros," L.L.O. AR/JUR/7457/2007 (Arg.).
123. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala VII [COrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section VII], 21/09/2005, "Pereyra, Liliana Marfa del Milagro c.
Arista, Marcelo Daniel y otro," L.L.O. AR/JUR/9307/2005 (Arg.); Cdmara Na-
cional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala VII [CTrab.] [National Court of Labor
Appeals, section VIII, 17/05/2007, "Serantes, Milagros J. I. c. Quifiones, Julio H. y
otro," D.T. 2007 (agosto), 915 (Arg.).
124. Cirnara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala 11 [CTrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section II], 23/04/2008, "Leguizam6n, Pablo Javier c. Palerva S.A.
y otro," D.T. 2008 (setiembre), 778 (Arg.).
125. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala Ill [CTrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section III], 19/02/2007, "Punta, Diego Leonardo c. Pronto Wash
S.A. y otros," L.L.O. AR/JUR/469/2007 (Arg.); Crmara Nacional de Apelaciones
del Trabajo, sala III [CTrab.] [National Court of Labor Appeals, section III], 26/11/
2008, "Chazarreta, H6ctor Edgardo c. Emparte S.R.L. y otros s/ despido," D.T.
2009 (julio) (Arg.); Crnara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala III [CTrab.]
[National Court of Labor Appeals, section III], 09/03/2009, "Jamar, Marfa Eugenia
c. Cheek S.A. y otro s/ despido," L.L.O. AR/JUR/8018/2009 (Arg.).
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only apparent), the franchisor should be liable.' 26
Because the solution for this issue is not clear, the franchisor should
always account for the serious possibility of being held liable for any la-
bor claims against the franchisee. In this sense, franchisors commonly
include two key provisions in the franchising agreement:
(i) Indemnity provisions. Although there are no legal obstacles in
agreeing upon an indemnity provision, these commitments are only
as good as the franchisee's solvency.
(ii) Franchisor's inspection and control abilities. In most franchising
agreements, the franchisor has the ability to inspect the fran-
chisee's activity and records to prevent any future claim (because
most claims come from the inaccuracy of the employee's registra-
tion). Although this might be the only way to prevent claims, it has
been ruled that including this ability also creates a duty for the
franchisor.127
The New Code expressly sets forth that the franchisor-franchisee rela-
tion does not create a labor relationship among the franchisor and the
franchisee's employees (except fraud). 12 8
E. DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE OFFICERS' LIABILITY
Another issue that foreign franchisors should take into serious consid-
eration is the ease with which Argentine labor courts pierce the corporate
veil to find both shareholders1 2 9 and directors 30 liable. Although the le-
gal requirements and factors capable of piercing the corporate veil are no
different than those under U.S. law (e.g., undercapitalization, alter ego, et
cetera), the most important factor is the use of the corporate form in a
fraudulent manner. Nevertheless, courts have surprisingly ruled that fail-
ing to duly register an employee is equal to creating a corporation just for
fraudulent acts.' 31
126. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala VIll [CTrab.] [National Court
of Labor Appeals, section III], 17/06/2008, "Farfas, Alicia Cristina c. Dieta ClubS.A. y otros," L.L.O. AR/JUR/4787/2008 (Arg.); Cmara Nacional de Apelaciones
del Trabajo, sala III [Cfrab.] [National Court of Labor Appeals, section II1], 28/02/
2007, "Fernindez, Mirta L. c. Aquino, Marciana y otro" (Arg.).
127. C~imara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala VI [CTrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section VI], 03/04/2008, "Cegna Fichera, Walter Gast6n c.
Supermercados Norte S.A. y otros," L.L.O. AR/JUR/2439/2008 (Arg.).
128. COo. Civ. Y COM. art. 1520 (b) (2012 Draft).
129. Law No. 19550 art. 54, Apr. 25, 1972, 22409 B.O. 11 (as amended) (Arg.).
130. Id. art. 59.
131. C~imara Nacional de Apelaciones del Trabajo, sala III [CTrab.] [National Court of
Labor Appeals, section III], 31/08/2012, "Rodriguez Varas, Cristian Martfn c. Go
For It S.R.L. y otros s/ despido," L.L.O. AR/JUR/45205/2012 (Arg.).
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V. CURRENCY ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SCENARIO
Currency restrictions in Argentina are probably the most important is-
sue for foreign investors nowadays (in addition to the problems that they
regularly cause for domestic businessmen). Even though currency restric-
tions had been common throughout Argentine history, they are often the
product of incidental circumstances because they are contrary to the
sense of freedom that guides the Argentine legal system. Furthermore,
currency restrictions are usually a result of underlying economic crisis.
But, as recent (and not so recent) history has proven, currency restric-
tions never helped solving economic crises. To the contrary, they have
always had the opposite effect by deepening the economic crisis and trig-
gering major political crises. 132
Current currency restrictions began soon after the major crisis of
2001-2002, when the government seized all private bank deposits to pre-
vent a collapse of the banking system. The causes of this crisis may be
found in the backlash created by the convertibility system enacted by the
Convertibility Act in 1991133 as a response to the hyperinflation scenario
that existed in the late 1980s. The Convertibility Act created a fixed ex-
change rate between the USD and the Argentine Peso (a currency cre-
ated by said law). 134 After the financial support to that system (the
profits of which were generated by the privatization of state-owned na-
tional companies) ran out, no further support to exports was developed.
They were diminished because of the lack of competiveness of Argentine
commodities in foreign markets since their prices were attached to the
USD. The system was dropped and the government was forced to deval-
uate in early 2002.
After the devaluation, certain currency provisions were enacted, creat-
ing the Mercado Onico y Libre de Cambios (Unique and Free Exchange
Market), in which only authorized financial institutions are able to per-
form exchange operations. 13 5 At this point, no significant restrictions
132. The most recent example of this occurred at the end of 2001, when a few days after
the government decreed that all of the domestic bank deposits in US$ were to be
converted into Argentine Pesos, massive public protests forced the then current
president (Fernando de la Rtia) to resign. Hubo 18 victimas rds en otra jornada
de estallido social, CLARfN (Dec. 21, 2001) available at http://edant.clarin.coml
diario/2001/12/21/p-329975.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). Furthermore, the last
currency restrictions implemented by the current government in October, 2011
negatively impacted the current president (Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) caus-
ing her approval ratings to drop significantly and currently causing massive public
protest against her government. Michael Warren, Cristina Fernandez De Kirch-
ner's Popularity Plunges As Inflation Soars In Argentina, Polls Show, HUFFINGTON
Posr (May 7, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/08/cristina-
fernandez-de-kirchner-popularity-n_3231726.html?view=print&comm ref=false.
133. Law No. 23928, Mar. 28, 1991, 27104 B.O. I (Arg.).
134. Law No. 23928 of Mar. 28, 1991.
135. AFIP General Resolution No. 3417/2012, Dec. 20, 2012, 32547 B.O. (as amended)
(Arg.).
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were made, but a simple information control process was introduced. 136
Exchange operations were freely made and the exchange rate was floata-
ble and solely determined by supply and demand.
It was in 2009 when the government established increasingly stringent
measures to slow the rate of inflation. As a preliminary note, it is impor-
tant to highlight that even if all of these measures were implemented by
formal executive legislation (enacted by the Argentine treasury), their fi-
nal implementation and the granting of any related authorization there-
upon was dependent on government officers' final approval. However,
the rules and criteria for specifically granting the authorizations were
never clarified and, until now, nobody but a few government officers re-
ally understands them.
1. Non-Automatic Import Licenses
In 2009, the non-automatic import licenses were created.137 Clearly vio-
lating the GATT agreement, these licenses provided that the importation
of several products would only be possible after the government author-
ized the particular import.138 Furthermore, no clear rules of procedure
were created and only importers close to the government or those who
made private and informal commitments with the Industry Department
were allowed to import. Most of them were eventually derogated.
2. Obligation to Liquidate Foreign Currency in the Unique and Free
Exchange Market
Argentine exporters of goods and services are required to bring the
foreign currency paid in consideration for the exported commodities and
liquidate them in the Argentine Unique and Free Exchange Market at
the official rate (the importance of the official rate will be evident after
reading the following sections of this article). Consequently, Argentine
exporters cannot retain abroad any amount paid to them (even if they are
to be used for paying for imports), and they must always repatriate them.
Over the months, the terms and conditions of this repatriation became
increasingly stringent.
3. Foreign Currency Transaction Consultation (FCTC)
Soon after the current president was re-elected in 2011, the govern-
ment implemented a system called Consulta de Operaciones Cambiarias
(Foreign Currency Transaction Consultation). 139
136. Id.
137. See Press Release, United States Challenges Argentina's Widespread Use of Im-
port Restrictions, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Aug. 21, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/node/7719 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
138. Id.
139. AFIP General Resolution No. 3210/2011, Oct. 31, 2011, B.O. 32266, 38 (as
amended) (Arg.).
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In its original form, the system provided that if any particular entity
intended to acquire foreign currency, they would have to log on to the
Administraci6n Federal de Ingresos Ptiblicos (Argentine Federal Tax Au-
thority, AFIP) website and ask for real-time authorization using their tax
identification number. 140 After a few glitches with the online system
were solved, the system proved to be effective (although inconvenient)
and people with good tax standing were able to acquire USD. It could be
estimated that a person would be authorized to acquire up to 60 percent
of his or her salary or monthly income, although nobody really knows
how this was calculated. However, given that it was required to go
through this procedure in order to wire money internationally, 14 1 it was
practically impossible to send large amounts of money abroad.'
42
As "well" as things may have been going, in May of 2012 the online
system stopped authorizing operations, even when the taxpayer had good
tax standing. After a few months like that and though the possibility of
buying foreign currency through the system was formally possible
(though no operation was ever approved), in July of 2012143 the govern-
ment finally enacted a resolution that prohibited individuals or entities
from acquiring USD for what was called atesoramiento (roughly trans-
lated as "savings"). Therefore, ordinary people were no longer able to
buy USD through the official market to protect their savings from infla-
tion by converting them into hard currency (now only able to do so
through the illegal market, discussed infra section 5.2). 14 4
4. DJAI (Anticipated Imports Affidavit)
The resolution took effect on January 1, 2 01 2 145 and provided that to
acquire foreign currency for imports' payments, the importer would have
to file several documents with the AFIP and wait for approval.' 46 This
requirement was independent from the need to obtain the non-auto-
140. Id. The political justification was that only people with good standing with the tax
authority should be able to acquire USD and only to the extent that their tax
filings would allow.
141. Id. Even if the individual already had UDS they would have to convert them into
Argentine pesos and, once again, buy USD.
142. Trade Regulations, Customs, and Standards, EXPORT.COv, http://export.gov/argen
tina/doingbusinessinargentina/argentinacountrycommercialguide/traderegulations
andstandards/index.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
143. Central Bank of Argentina, "A" Communication No. 5318 (Arg.).
144. Only a few exceptions were made for people who could prove that they would be
travelling abroad but, obviously, the rules for this acquisition were (and remain)
unclear. However, credit card payments made abroad were still possible as it was
of paying the credit card bill in Argentine pesos at the official exchange rate.
Nonetheless, as of October 1, 2012 a 15 percent withholding tax was added to that
payment and, after a few months, it was increased to 20 percent (currently, is 35
percent). Although AFIP eventually restored the individuals' ability to acquire
foreign currency for savings, it can only be done for up to 20 percent of the individ-
ual's monthly income and it is subject to a 20 percent withholding tax has to be
added.
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matiC' 47 importing license referred to above. Even though many of the
non-automatic importing licenses were eventually derogated, the DJAI
procedure is still in force.
5. DJAS (Anticipated Services Affidavit)
Enacted shortly after the DJAI, this system provides a similar proce-
dure for any payment to be made abroad in consideration for foreign
services, including consideration for trademark license agreements and
royalties. 148 In this case, the recipient of the services would have to file
several documents with the National Central Bank in order to acquire the
necessary foreign currency. 149 For payments over $100,000 USD in one
year or over $10,000 USD in a single payment, the National Central
Bank's authorization is needed. For lower payments, only the filing is
needed (which itself is rather troublesome, even if no authorization is
needed).1 50
6. Dividend Payments for Foreign Shareholders
By the end of 2012, the currency restrictions for wiring dividends
abroad (both for branches of foreign entities as well as subsidiaries) were
formalized (even if it was rather difficult to send dividends abroad prior
to this, no formal legislation was enacted). 151 Once again, there is a filing
procedure with the National Central Bank and in every case, an authori-
zation from it is needed.1 52 Before this regulation, the National Central
Bank required the filing of several documents and in order to get final
approval, an email had to be sent (to a Gmail address, which further dem-
onstrates the informality of the system). Currently, even if the procedure
is duly completed, no authorization of this kind is practically granted.
B. THE CREATION OF THE INFORMAL (AND ILLEGAL)
EXCHANGE MARKET
The enactment of these restrictions (mostly the FTCT) led to the crea-
tion of an informal market (called the "blue market") where both people
and entities would resort to acquiring foreign currency without complying
with the hard and practically impossible requirements. 53 This market is
completely illegal.' 5 4 Nonetheless, the exchange rate for this market is
147. Id. Contrary to an "automatic license," the non-automatic license depends on a
particular government approval.




151. AFIP General Resolution No. 3417/2012, Dec. 20, 2012, 32547 B.O. (as amended)
(Arg.).
152. Id.
153. Patrick J. McGinnis, Meanwhile, In Argentina The Black Market Dollar Exchange
Has 17,000 Facebook Likes, BUSINI-SS INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/
argentina-black-market-dollar-exchange-2013-6 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
154. Id.
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commonly publicized in newspapers and even an app for the iOS was
developed to provide updated rates.155
Currently, the difference between the official market and the blue mar-
ket is about 70 percent and it continues to increase with every new cur-
rency restriction implemented by the government. 156 Nonetheless,
individuals still buy USD in this market since they prefer to save in USD
rather than in Argentine pesos.157 On the other hand, it is worth men-
tioning that, even though this is an illegal market, most prices and infla-
tion are attached to this rate rather than the official rate.
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FOREIGN INVESTOR/FRANCHISOR
The consequences for the foreign investor/franchisor are evident. Any
prospective franchisor thinking about investing should be aware that it
would very difficult to take any profits from the Argentine business ven-
ture. If those profits are to be sent abroad by way of royalty payments,
they would have to comply with the DJAS procedure and, if over
$100,000 USD, they would have to wait (for a long time) for the National
Central Bank authorization. If those profits are to be sent abroad by way
of dividends, they would have to wait for an authorization that will never
come.
In addition, if they are to import goods they may have to comply with
the DJAI and, if applicable, with the non-automatic license import. Re-
garding this issue, a case involving Starbucks Coffee Company was fa-
mous. After running out of their original stock for the classic Starbucks
cups, Starbucks had to use domestically-manufactured cups (of a clearly
inferior quality) because they were unable to import to correct ones. 158
Even if after considering these restrictions, a foreign franchisor would
still be willing to invest in Argentina, he would have to send the foreign
investment though the official market and receive the equivalent amount
of AR$ according to the official rate. However, his investment would not
be as cost efficient as it could be (because most of the prices in Argentina
are attached to the blue rate) because this rate does not reflect the actual
value of the money.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT THE FUTURE LOOKS LIKE FOR
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN ARGENTINA
Investing in Argentina is, at least for now, unclear. Even if the differ-
ences between the Argentine legal system and the U.S. legal system are
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no reason to frighten a foreign franchisor (because they are far more wel-
coming than many other legislations), the current currency restrictions,
though incidental and hopefully temporary, make foreign investment dif-
ficult nowadays.
By enacting these restrictions, the current government has closed the
door for foreign investments in general and foreign franchisors in particu-
lar. Minor franchisors who have already invested in Argentina are cur-
rently leaving the country. Major franchisors with huge investments in
Argentina are trying to keep them just to avoid the enormous losses that
leaving the country would entail, hoping that the situation will eventually
change. Surprisingly, they are taking the opportunity to expand their
businesses while waiting for a regulatory change because they are not
distributing their profits.
Nonetheless, political and economic analysts foresee that any candidate
supported by the current government 159 will probably fail to be elected as
president in the next presidential election. Although the ruling govern-
ment did not lose the control of the National Congress after the 2013
legislative elections, they have certainly lost a great deal of political
power. Thus, it is yet to be seen what the government's approach will be
during the upcoming two years until the 2015 presidential elections.
159. The current government started in 2003, when Nestor Kirchner was elected as
president. It currently continues with his wife, Cristina Fernandez, as president.
Given that the Argentine Constitution prevents a person from being elected for
more than two consecutive terms, she cannot be elected as president in 2015. Ar-
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